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STEVENS, REALITY, AND RHETORIC
~Your trouble, Robert, is that you write
poems about -- things."
--Wallace stevens to Robert Frost1
One of the major issues in Stevens criticism since
its inception revolves around his use of the terms reality
and imagination. What is reality and what is imagination
and to what extent do they participate in art and life?
These questions plague stevens and appear again and again in
his poetry, often accompanied by a distinctive use of
figurative language. Stevens is aware of the duality he is
working with in the terms reality and imagination,
subtitling his collected essays The Necessary Angel: Essays
on Reality and the Imagination. How stevens defines and
relates these terms and shapes his poetics around them is
important in understanding stevens and the complexity
inherent in his poems.
A critical approach that examines stevens' attempt to
use linguistic and rhetorical play can answer these
questions and clarify his technique. Central to stevens'
1
2
poetics is figurative language which is based on this sense
of play. Figurative tropes such as metaphor, simile,
synecdoche, and, what I want to stress, metonymy, form a
structural underpinning for stevens' poems. Even as early
as 1919, in the poem ~Anecdote of the Jar," stevens is in
command of this structure and is able to use it to spell out
his understanding of the relationship between reality and
the imagination. Reading this deceptively simple poem as an
example of metonymy challenges the usual metaphorical
readings of the poem. Later, especially in his longer
poems, stevens expands on these ideas and a ~theoretical"
poem such as ~A Primitive Like an Orb" explicitly confronts
the relationship between language and reality and the
imagination. The poem's conclusion can then serve to elicit
parallel ideas from the earlier more imagistic poem. Before
approaching the two poems, I will briefly survey the
critical background of these two underlying issues in
stevens' poetry: the issue of reality and the imagination,
and his use of figurative language, especially metaphor,
simile, and metonymy. Then, I will show how these two
issues are vitally related in an attempt to understand
stevens.
~--------------------------3-
Notes Toward Defining Reality and the Imagination
stevens repeatedly calls attention to ~the thing
itself" throughout his poetry (CP 534). He also uses the
similar phrase, ~things as they are" (CP 165). These
phrases appear to refer to reality and give the sense that
reality can be linked with the physical world, with the
insistent mention of ~things." However, stevens explicitly
defines reality in his essay ~The Noble Rider and the Sound
of Words" as ~the life that is lived in the scene it
composes and so reality is not that external scene but the
life that is lived in it" (NA 25). He also writes in The
Necessary Angel that ~reality is not the thing but the
aspect of the thing" (95). These definitions shift reality
from the physical world to a perception of it. There is not
a common base of reality, but only a phenomenological
awareness of it. Elsewhere in his writings, stevens offers
other definitions for the term reality. In the Adagia, he
states that ~reality is the spirit's true center" (OP 201)
and that ~reality is the object seen in its greatest common
sense" (OP 202). This suggests the privilege that stevens
gives to reality, whatever it is, whether it is subject or
object, whether it can be touched or only perceived.
An even more curious aspect of stevens' reality is
that there is a sense of more than one r~af~~Y~ in stevens'
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words, ~degrees of reality" (NA 7). Often in his poetry,
the initial object is present, which is one reality, and
then after the imagination works on the object, a new
reality results--what stevens refers to as one's ~individual
reality" (NA 94). He remarks that ~a sense of reality keen
enough to be in excess of the normal sense of reality
creates a reality of its own" (NA 79). This reality has as
much validity for stevens, but is in no way linked to the
physical. At the same time, instead of creating a new
manifestation of the thing by use of the imagination,
stevens also attempts to perceive a basic reality, what he
calls the ~first idea." In a seemingly Platonic viewpoint,
the first idea becomes the primal source, untouched by the
imagination or metaphor. This sense of reality also
transcends the physical world, but in a non-imaginative way.
Although the concept of the imagination is another
major element in stevens and is ever-present, stevens does
not seem to pay as much specific attention to it as he does
to the question of defining reality. Essentially, the
imagination is the active force that perceives reality. The
key for stevens is that imagination alters the thing itself.
stevens views this alteration negatively which subsequently
clouds his attitude towards the imagination. 2 In a critical
angle that approaches a nihilistic point of view, J. Hillis
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Miller defines stevens' concept of ~the imagination [as] the
inner nothingness, while reality is the barren external
world with which imagination carries on its endless
intercourse" (~Poetry of Being" 145). In stevens' view, the
imaginative process of perception creates a new, adulterated
reality. The nothingness that many critics describe as
vital to stevens is a full nothingness, not an empty one.
Only at the central core is there an absence, but this
absence defines the lack which then implies the desire for
fulfillment. To Miller, stevens' problem is to reconcile
the two terms, reality and imagination. Miller states that
this is impossible, but stevens is determined to attempt it
anyway. One way in which stevens attempts this is to come
to terms with the lack of a center.
What seems more important than a strict definition of
these terms, then, is to define the relationship between
reality and the imagination. stevens states in The
Necessary Angel, ~the imagination and reality...are equal
and inseparable" (24). But when stevens writes that ~the
imagination loses vitality as it ceases to adhere to what is
real" (NA 6), he implies that reality is a more immediate
force and, hence, more preferred. ~Eventually," stevens
remarks in the Adagia, ~an imaginary world is entirely
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without interest" (OP 200). While the imagination is
valuable for stevens, reality is necessary.
The relationship between the two terms in stevens'
writings is clouded by his nearly contradictory statements.
In the Adagia he states that ~there is nothing in the world
greater than reality. In this predicament we have to accept
reality itself as the only genius" (OP 201). The way
stevens words this adagia as a ~predicament" that has to--is
almost forced to--be accepted suggests that it is an
apparent concession, as if stevens grudgingly gives credence
to reality instead of the imagination. In opposition to
this attitude, stevens writes to Theodore Weiss that
~certainly the things that I have written recently are
intended to express an agreement with reality" (L 463) .
stevens wrote this letter in 1944, fairly late in his
career, so the ~recently" may indicate a progression in the
poetry. stevens also makes the remark that ~The imagination
is one of the great human powers" (OP 138). Here, as in
other places, stevens gives preference to the imagination.
stevens' response to a questionnaire from the Partisan
Review resolves part of the contradiction in his remarks on
the use of reality and the imagination: ~The material of
the imagination is reality and reality can be nothing else
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except the usable past" (OP 309). In the intertwining of
the terms, stevens is most satisfied. 3
The crux of the problem lies in identifying on what
level of abstraction stevens is thinking at the time. At
one point, he may be referring to the physical world as
reality, about which he becomes disenchanted as he does with
the altered result of imaginative perception. It is only
with the basic reality of stevens' "first idea," because it
is elusive and because he cannot ever perceive it, that
stevens is satisfied. The endless desire to locate the
first idea may in part satiate his questing poetics.
Approaching stevens' poetry by way of reality and
imagination is not, by any means, an original approach,4 but
is necessary since the terms are a crucial aspect of
stevens' work. Surveying the ground of Stevens commentary,
J.S. Leonard and C.E. Wharton in their recent study of
Stevens' idea of reality, The Fluent Mundo, neatly organize
it into four categories: decreative, romantic, ontological,
and phenomenological. 5 Leonard and Wharton create a
critical narrative that begins with the debate by early
critics whether Stevens is a humanist or aestheticist,
continues with the questioning of the romantic impulse in
Stevens' poetry, and focuses finally on the influence of
"decreative" and deconstructive theories as they are applied
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to stevens. 6 Joseph C. Kronick, in his article ~Metamorphic
stevens," states that the use of the terms reality and
imagination practically forces critics to choose sides,
without allowing another term to mediate. Critics writing
on stevens must confront his use of reality and imagination
and their apparent paradoxical relationship. The history of
stevens criticism is replete with various ideas on the
meaning and relation of the terms, and since these terms are
so fully entrenched in the romantic vocabulary, the
romantic/decreative debate as summarized by Leonard and
Wharton is the most appropriate for this topic. The debate
raised by critics calling themselves either Romantic or
Post-structuralist is important since it involves
ontological and epistemological questions which stevens'
reality and imagination also consider: for instance, What
is real and in what sense? What should the artist concern
her or himself with? What is the basis of living? The
issues are of great concern to stevens, and his poetry often
expresses his deep need to reconcile them.
On one side of the Romantic/post-structuralist
debate, Harold Bloom, Joseph Riddel, James Carroll, and
Northrop Frye perceive stevens in the Romantic tradition: as
either the last of the Romantic poets or as the culmination
of a romantic tradition. While stevens himself is skittish
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about aligning himself with the name Romantic (as in 19th-
century British poets), he would see himself as a
culmination of a romantic tradition. He differentiates
between a pejorative Romantic and a new romantic:
But poetry is essentially romantic, only the
romantic of poetry must be something constantly
new and, therefore, just the opposite of what is
spoken of as the romantic. Without this new
romantic, one gets nowhere; with it, the most
casual things take on transcendence, and the poet
rushes brightly, and so on. What one is always
doing is keeping the romantic pure: eliminating
from it what people speak of as the romantic (L
277) •
The romantic for stevens is a constant re-seeing in order to
attain an awareness of a truth. Critics such as Bloom,
Carroll, and Riddel valorize the imagination as a means to a
transcendent truth despite stevens' own statements against
the imagination. Bloom sees stevens as the heir of not only
the British line of Romantic writers, Keats, Shelley, and
Wordsworth, but also the American line, characterized by
Emerson. James Carroll applies the terminology of the
Romantic sublime to Stevens' poetry, while Riddel focuses on
the Romantic impulse of self-creation as an act of the mind.
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Helen Vendler, whose On Extended Wings is an important study
of stevens' longer poems, also emphasizes the imaginative
aspects of stevens.?
On the other side of the debate, Roy Harvey Pearce and
Helen Reguerio, among others, advocate stevens' preference
for reality, in stevens' own terms, ~the thing itself" (CP
534). In doing so, they argue against the value of the
imagination, describing it as a corrupter of reality.
Although not necessarily post-structuralists, these critics'
views often espouse the same ideas of post-structuralist
critics. In her study The Limits of Imagination, for
example, Reguerio states that the quest for unity, which is
the work of the imagination, always fails. stevens' poetry,
according to Reguerio, shows how the imagination is
constantly undercutting its own validity. Although Pearce,
in his study The Continuity of American Poetry, begins with
the concept of continuity, implying a link with the Romantic
precursors, he suggests that in his later poetry stevens
achieves a way of conceiving known reality directly through
a Kantian synthesis of self and outside world.
In stevens' own writing, the relationship between
reality and imagination is contradictory at best, and any
critic can easily be tempted into oversimplifying stevens.
Post-structuralist critics such as Paul Bove and J. Hillis
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Miller offer interesting views on the oversimplification of
stevens. According to Bove:
There is in stevens' poetry a curious alternation
of opposites which critics ascribe to his Romantic
heritage. Like Pearce, they claim that stevens'
alternating sympathy in the reality-imagination
conflicts is a dialectical movement which will
lead to a synthesis. This is, of course, a
convenient and comfortable way of justifying and
thereby eliminating by resolution, the
~simultaneous" existence of opposites in stevens.
(207)
Bove's statement is supported by stevens' own suggestion of
an interconnecting link between the two terms. For Bove,
though, the synthesis produces nothing; there is no center.
Hillis Miller suggests that between the two simultaneously
true poles, there is great difference and movement (146),
and stevens must find a way to write poetry which will
possess simultaneously both extremes, while not ending in
compromise with some constructed middle term. This appears
to be something of a paradox. How can stevens be both and
at the same time neither? The problem surfaces in stevens'
essays and adagia as they portray conflicting themes.
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Figurative Language in stevens
Critics who attempt to understand the paradoxical
relationship of reality and the imagination in stevens'
poetry often look toward his use of language, particularly
his use of figurative language. The musical quality of
stevens' poetry as well as the inherent play in his language
often initially attracts readers to stevens. stevens is
clearly able to use language to suggest his position. The
use of metaphor seen as a linguistic reflection of unity is
one possibility. Metaphor clearly defines subject and
object differences. Northrop Frye in his early influential
article ~The Realistic Oriole," for example, theorizes
stevens' world as one of total metaphor (74). According to
Frye, the center of mental activity as it perceives reality
is the imagination and the view of art is nature realized as
a unity (64-65). Frye notes an apparent contradiction in
stevens' definition of metaphor, which he sees pejoratively
as it is linked with resemblance. It is only when metaphor
is connected to unity as identification that Frye sees a
workable term in stevens. Both Frye and Joseph Riddel see
the urge to unity as the key to stevens' metaphor. Riddel
compares stevens to Whitman with their use of metaphoric,
Adamic naming, which both unifies and identifies for stevens
and Whitman. The unifying movement provides an appealing
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reconciliation of the disjunction between reality and
imagination. The unifying nature of metaphor is the goal of
the Romantics as they attempt to make the external world
part of the internal self. The Romantic notion of the Self
as it encompasses nature follows along metaphoric lines.
stevens' metaphor, according to Sheehan, goes just to the
point of knowledge but recoils the moment complete identity
is reached, echoing Stevens' maxim that poetry resists the
intelligence almost successfully (60).
Stevens' use of metaphor, however, poses yet another
paradox. In her study of Stevens and Simile, Jacqueline
Vaught Brogan points out that Stevens is faced with a
problem: he desires to believe in metaphor, but at the same
time knows that it is not true (30). The falsity of
metaphor is an issue that many critics see as the crux of
Stevens' problem with reality and imagination. Joseph
Kronick suggests that stevens settles for neither reality
nor imagination since metaphor cannot be trusted as a link
between reality and imagination, or between language and
object (~Of Parents" 139). The split between the tenor and
vehicle in metaphor, the impossibility of creating a real
bridge, causes a splitting or fragmenting in metaphor
itself, and, according to Brogan, the apparent unity between
tenor and vehicle which is never actually present is reason
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for stevens' inconsistent and ambivalent attitude towards
metaphor (183). Riddel, Reguerio, and Eugene Nassar all
define metaphor as ultimately fake, false, or transitory.
Reguerio notes that the rejection of metaphor is a rejection
of totality, while Nassar aligns metaphor with imagination,
as a means of ordering chaos, and shows how they are seen as
both true and false (19). Charles Altieri directly states
that metaphors lie and regards stevens as successful because
he progresses past the paradox of metaphor (30). What these
critics then propose is that stevens uses metaphor as a
means of undercutting itself: to show itself as a false
image of reality. In this view, stevens sees "metaphor as
degeneration," the phrase taken from stevens' poem of the
same name (CP 444) •
The first section of stevens' long poem, "Notes Toward
a Supreme Fiction," illustrates how he tends to distrust
metaphor. Using the image of the sun, a favorite of
Stevens, the speaker of the poem commands the ephebe to "see
the sun again with an ignorant eye/And see it clearly in the
idea of it" (CP 380). Clearly, Stevens believes the sun
must not be seen with a metaphoric eye, for to see it
metaphorically would be not to see it all, but rather to see
something else substituted for it. However, the sun (as
sensory object par excellence) can only be seen by metaphor.
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If seen with the naked eye, the eye will be blinded by the
sun's pure sensory nature. 8 The sun must be seen only in
being; it cannot be named. stevens continues, "Phoebus is
dead" (CP 381). Phoebus as a name for the sensory sun is no
longer valid. As classical Roman name, Phoebus is to see
one impossible thing (the sun) as another impossible thing
(the god Apollo) .
stevens further states, "But Phoebus was/A name for
something that never could be named...The sun/Must bear no
name, gold flourisher, but be/In the difficulty of what it
is to be" (CP 381). The tension in stevens' mind is
reflected in the insertion of a metaphorical name, the
identifying epithet "gold flourisher." The name gold
flourisher, more Old English kenning than classical myth,
sounds as if it is quickly inserted into the poem. Even
stevens cannot completely divorce himself from this urge to
place a name on the idea, although the ridiculousness of the
title "gold flourisher" may be stevens' attempt to undercut
the name.
Often identified as a trope of substitution, metaphor
assumes a sense of identification if the metaphor is
successful: the supreme fiction can be identified via a
metaphor of the sun. stevens admits that reality is
difficult: imaginative seeing only appears to make it
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simple and, thus, metaphor is to be distrusted. All
metaphor is false since it substitutes the original object
for an object more simple to comprehend.
It is fairly evident that stevens, if he does not
reject metaphor, distrusts it. His use of metaphor, then,
needs to be approached warily. Instead of metaphor,
Jacqueline Vaught Brogan sees in stevens' use of simile the
possibility of a conciliation between unity (metaphor) and
fragmentation. A possible solution to the problem of naming
the unnameable is by asserting the identity as as; that is,
recognition by similarity. According to Brogan, metaphor
and fragmentation are the two poles of language--not
opposites, but mutually dependent. She points out, however,
that the relationship is not a Hegelian dialectic, from
which a synthesis results, but a relationship in which
stevens can possess both poles through a tension created by
simile (14). She proposes a solution to what Miller and
Bove have suggested. Brogan states that stevens is not
concerned with language as either metaphor or fragmentation,
but rather with language as it contains and reveals both
directions. Simile, by its nature, suggests a unity as
metaphor does, but undercuts it at the same time by the use
of like or as. According to Brogan, simile is both unitive
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and fragmentary, or at least holds both within a tension by
its form.
Brogan's approach is enlightening and holds much
credence. stevens is fond of simile and the figure can be
found throughout his poetry. But at the same time, simile
appears too easy, deferring the problem by placing it as as.
Metonymy, as (re) formulated from the classical trope by
Roman Jakobson in the 19505, and subsequently re-read by
Lacan and others, offers a greater possibility. Briefly,
metonymy, by asserting a contiguous relationship, emphasizes
the gap between the elements and the desire to fill that
gap. Several studies have utilized metonymy in their
reading of Stevens, but none have taken full advantage of
the trope's possibilities. Harold Bloom in his influential
study Wallace Stevens: The Poems of our Climate defines
various poetic crossings, or moments of disjunction, in
which tropes turn into other tropes. He parallels Stevens'
poems with the Romantic crisis poems of Keats and
Wordsworth. Bloom identifies three distinct crossings which
correspond to poetic crises: the Crossing of Election moves
from irony to synecdoche in order to answer the question,
~Am I truly a poet?"; the Crossing of Solipsism asks ~Can I
love someone other than myself?" and moves from the
metonymic to the hyperbolic; and ultimately, the Crossing of
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Identification is a confrontation of one's mortality and
takes place between metaphor and metalepsis (402-403).
According to Bloom, tropic play is rhetorical power as
persuasion, rhetorical persuasion as power. His system,
however, suggests a hierarchic, privileged system as one
trope progresses to another. Bloom sees metonymy evident in
~Sunday Morning," but only as a step toward the
metaphorical. For Bloom, there is development toward a
privileged trope of discourse.
Margaret Dickie and Joseph C. Kronick have also
suggested reading stevens metonymically, and both see
metonymy as a genealogical trope of reduction. Dickie in
her book, Lyric Contingencies: Emily Dickinson and Wallace
Stevens, distinguishes stevens from the Romantics by his use
of metonymic description, essentially identifying stevens as
a metonymic poet. With stevens, according to Dickie, the
external attributes are what make up the individual (111).
stevens externalizes the internal whereas the Romantic poets
internalize the external. Dickie uses stevens' poem
~Theory" to illustrate this: ~I am what is around me" (CP
45). The same is true with the poet. The poet is
determined by the future audience. However the link between
poet and future audience is a tenuous genealogical link
dependent on the uncertainty of the contingent line between
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source (poet) and heirs (readers). Temporality threatens to
dissolve this link. Dickie's effort is partly feminist as
she associates the genealogical trope with a catastrophe
located at the center of the family, which shifts the scene
of location from the father to the mother.
Kronick, in "Large White Man Reading: stevens'
Genealogy of the Giant," also discusses metonymy as a
familial trope with relations to genealogy as it focuses on
history and origins. Kronick suggests that stevens operates
in a Nietzschean godless world (93) in which the text no
longer contains any essential meaning; now superficial
appearance and artificial language are all that matter since
truth no longer is a prerequisite for language (90-2).
Genealogy as a familial trope is set in deserted places, not
homes, and is evident not of a psychical struggle, but a
displacing of the genetic link between figural and proper
meaning. Reduction to the First Idea is not an approach to
the thing itself, but a bridge between being and seeing that
ties language to the phenomenal world. For Kronick, there
is no poetry of the giant; it is only seen through lesser
beings such as the ephebe. Kronick states that a metonymic
reading of stevens, focusing on the surface rather than the
essence, would distinguish it greatly from both romantic
readings and phenomenological ones (95). Unfortunately, he
does not offer in what way this would be different.
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In her feminist reading of ~Peter Quince at the
Clavier," Mary Nyquist briefly, but importantly, notes the
presence of metonymy in the poem. Nyquist describes the
effect Susanna has on the elders: through cause and effect,
her nudity causes the elders' inner ~bawdy strings" to react
(317). Nyquist argues that stevens confuses the
subjective/objective nature of the poem and that the text
plays with Susanna's music as both metonymy and metaphor.
The question is whether the music belongs to Susanna or the
reader, if it exists in her own memory or if the effect is
caused by the music being located between these two
alternatives in the reader's memory. There exists
ambiguity, but, according to Nyquist, the text forces the
poem to be read metonymically. By being metonymic, the text
leaves an impression that Susanna has been violated and
implicates the reader in the accusation of voyeurism charged
against the elders. This reading clearly suggests the
potential metonymy holds, especially as it relates to a
confusion between subject and object. As Nyquist's reading
shows, metonymy can affect the relation between poem and
reader in a significant manner.
Most recently, Daniel Schwarz reiterates the argument
that both metaphor and metonymy are crucial to reading
Stevens and that a valid reading depends on a dialogue
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between the tropes (18). In his study Narrative and
Representation in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, however,
Schwarz reads metonymy too simplistically as relating only
to contiguous relations, and proceeds to belabor the
metaphoric in Stevens. Schwarz's goal is to show how
humanism (as representation) has been neglected for word-
play in Stevens criticism, but as he remarks over and over,
stevens represents the physical through rhetoric and
linguistic play. Schwarz suggests the desire present in
stevens and words his argument in terms of metaphor and
metonymy. He notes that each metaphor lacks the correct
nuance and that this inability to properly name propels a
continuous search for yet another trope (22). With his
argument, Schwarz implies the inability of metaphor to
attain truthful identity.
These critics clearly show the validity of examining
the metonymic in Stevens. Kronick comes to one of the same
conclusions I have: that Stevens, through metonymy, is able
to force a disjunction or recognize one already present
between figural and proper meaning of language and that
Stevens has a ~desire to touch the muddy center" (Kronick,
~Large White Man" 97). However, Kronick's approach through
seeing metonymy as genealogy misses important elements that
metonymy is able to distinguish. Dickie suffers the same
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drawback, although her reading, like Schwarz's, is even more
simplistic in applying metonymy. There is not a single
concerted study of metonymy in Stevens, probably because
stevens appears metaphoric at first glance. It is true that
the metaphoric and the metonymic mix in stevens, but it is
exactly this mixture that allows the metonymic to undercut
the metaphoric, subverting the seeming priority it has.
stevens himself may not be aware of this subversion,
although his writings show that he is uncertain of the
privilege the metaphoric has received.
stevens is an important poet, and while this is
commonly understood and accepted, it is difficult to explain
his importance or classify him in a neat category. An
explanation may reside in his dealings with reality and
imagination. These questions (of reality and imagination)
are important in reading stevens because they play such an
integral part in his poetics. In addition to the immediate
gratification stevens' poems has for the reader through the
sheer musicality of his verse, the philosophical debate
underlying the poems is a clear mirror of the philosophical
arguments nagging the modern period. The affinity of
stevens' poetry to practically every critical theory since
the 1950s also suggests this appeal. Metonymy exposes the
lack of a center. It describes reality by those objects
surrounding the center. Because there is a center and
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margin which can never correspond, there can never be a
unified whole. Looking for the metonymic moments and also
the moments of tension between the metonymic and the
metaphoric can reveal the complexity in stevens' poetry and
can inform the questions he raises about reality and
imagination. For stevens, reality is something to be
desired; in a sense, it is a desire for a unified whole.
However, stevens understands that it is a desire that cannot
be fulfilled. Metaphor deludes with the prospect of unity
and a fulfillment of desire. Metonymy, on the other hand,
exists in the paradox between simultaneously acknowledging
desire and acknowledging the futility of desire. Metonymic
figures which appear in stevens' poetry indicate his
approach to the desire for reality in a non-metaphoric way.
The next chapter will clarify the differences between
metaphor and metonymy that I see as important in dealing
with stevens. The following two chapters will then focus on
two of stevens' poems, "A Primitive Like an Orb" and
"Anecdote of the Jar" to specifically illustrate how




Resemblance, stevens remarks in the prose portion of
~Three Academic Pieces," is the most ~significant component"
of reality because it creates a relation among things that
binds them together (NA 73). Poetry satisfies the desire
for resemblance and, by doing so, ~touches the sense of
reality, heightens it, intensifies it" (77). In the essay,
stevens discards both identity and imitation as false
resemblance: in identity resemblance disappears, while
imitation is artificial resemblance. Resemblance
immediately calls forth the metaphoric reliance on
similarity, which Stevens discusses:
If resemblance is described as a partial
similarity between two dissimilar things, it
complements and reinforces that which the two
dissimilar things have in common. It makes it
brilliant. When the similarity is between things
of adequate dignity, the resemblance may be said
to transfigure or to sublimate them. Take, for
example, the resemblance between reality and any
projections of it in belief or in metaphor. What
24
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is it that these two have in common? Is not the
glory of the idea of any future state a relation
between a present and a future glory? (NA 77)
stevens goes so far as to call metaphor a symbol of all
poetic tropes. Throughout the essay, stevens refers to
resemblances as metaphor and metaphor as the language of
poetry. He notes the following description in terms of
metaphor:
The wig of a particular man reminds us of some
other particular man and resembles him. A strand
of a child's hair brings back the whole child and
in that way resembles the child. There must be
vast numbers of things within this category.
Apparently objects of sentiment most easily prove
the existence of this kind of resemblance:
something in a locket, one's grandfather's high
beaver hat, one's grandmother's hand-woven
blanket. (NA 75)
These examples are poetic tropes. They are obviously not,
however, all metaphors. The hair connected physically and
organically to the child is a synecdoche. Even if it has
been cut and is no longer connected to the child's head, its
power of resemblance only resides in the past proximity with
the child. The grandfather's high beaver hat and the
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grandmother's hand-woven blanket are metonymic in that they
are related only because they have been associated with the
people they ~resemble." A blanket would not mean anything
unless it had been in close physical contact with (or
created by, to use another way of identifying metonymy) the
grandmother. Why does stevens consistently call
resemblances metaphor and what does he mean by the term
resemblance when these other tropes are not based on
resemblance, but rather are based on proximity and
connection, be it organic or physical? The answer to the
second question seems to rest with stevens' conflation of
figurative tropes, seeing all resemblance as metaphor. In
this he is not alone; he follows the tradition of the
nineteenth-century writers and critics in identifying all
figurative language as metaphor and symbol. Part of the
conflation rests with the seeming privilege given to
metaphor and symbol. While they are not technically the
same, the terms metaphor and symbol have come to be
interchangeable, both assuming a truth value since symbol
and metaphor act to accurately identify the other term.
Identity is reflected in the symbol/metaphor, with all of
reflection's metaphysical assumptions of truth.
Paul de Man has noted how metaphor has been
historically privileged since Aristotle. De Man suggests
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this hierarchic arrangement results from aligning analogy
(metaphor) with necessity, and contiguity (metonymy) with
chance (Allegories of Reading 14). The privilege of
metaphor over metonymy (and all other tropes) resulted in an
elevation of metaphor to what Jonathan Culler calls a
"figure of figures" (189), encompassing all rhetorical
figures. Metaphor was seen as all of rhetoric.
Both de Man and Culler note that this shift occurred
during the nineteenth century as the rationalistic
eighteenth century shifted to Romanticism. Culler suggests
that this occurred because of an attempt to legitimize
rhetoric. Metaphor was the one figure most notably seen as
showing essential qualities of relationships (through its
essential utilization of similarity) and as such, truth,
especially as opposed to the chance occurrence of metonymy:
metaphors are able to show reality in a different aspect
(Culler 192). De Man discusses the relationship between
symbol and allegory and states that the main Romantic
question of the nineteenth century was not a dialectic
between subject and object, but rather an intersubjective
relation set in temporal terms in which an atemporal Other
posits itself out of reach of the self. Allegory, which
does not attempt unity (as symbol does), instead establishes
a separation, or distance, in which allegory ~prevents the
28
self from an illusory identification with the non-self,
which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-
self" (~Rhetoric of Temporality" 207). In the same way,
metaphor, like symbol, proposes a unity in which one term
substitutes and replaces another. When the vehicle comes to
represent the tenor, when the metaphor is privileged, the
tenor is replaced. The signifier represents yet another
signifier since the signified is the Other, or the Other of
the Other as the signified is itself yet another signifier
of another signifier, always apart. Metonymy, on the other
hand, because it depends on proximity for its
identification, must maintain a distance--a gap that cannot
be crossed. The desire for unity, which marks the Romantic
impulse, accounts for the seeming dominance of
metaphor/symbol during this period. Jerome Bump, in an
article on stevens' and D.H. Lawrence's relation to science
and nature, states that metaphor is the preferred tool in
science as well as in poetry (50). It is just this
assumption that has relegated metonymy to a secondary
importance. 9
Roman Jakobson, however, resituated metonymy and
metaphor as the two fundamental terms of rhetoric, dividing
the whole of rhetoric into these two polar terms. 10
Classically, metonymy has been defined as the transfer of
the name of a thing to something associated by various
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relations--cause and effect, container and contained,
possessor and possessed (Bredin 45)--and has long been
discussed as one of the major tropes. Metonymy has always
been in the linguistic system from Quintillian to Peter
Ramus to Roman Jakobson, even as each has reduced the number
of tropes (Bredin 47). Jakobson, a linguist studying the
communicative styles of aphasic patients, described two
types of aphasic disorders, a contiguity disorder
characterized by the ability to select words but the
inability to combine them properly and a similarity disorder
characterized by the reverse. Jakobson lists several
variations on these characteristics, but in general each
disorder is identified by the lack of a certain ability.
He then assigns metaphor to the contiguity disorder and
metonymy to the similarity disorder: "Metaphor is alien to
the similarity disorder, and metonymy to the contiguity
disorder" ("TWO Aspects" 254) Jakobson also established
selection and combination as basic operations of language,
aligning selection with metaphor and combination with
metonymy.
Classical figures of rhetoric, then, such as
synecdoche, antonomasia, simile, and metalepsis, are dropped
completely or subsumed under metaphor or metonymy just as
Culler and de Man suggest happened earlier in the nineteenth
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century. Jakobson, for example, assigns simile to metaphor
and synecdoche to metonymy, causing the two terms, metaphor
and metonymy, to become overdetermined in their meaning. I
agree with Jakobson's subsuming of synecdoche under metonymy
to a certain extent. I would argue that synecdoche as
defined as part for the whole relies on a contiguous link,
the difference being that synecdoche's link is organic while
the metonymic link is either, as de Man suggests, pure
chance or, as others suggest, socially ingrained. There is
also a difference between metaphor and synecdoche in that
the two elements in a synecdoche coexist whereas in metaphor
they tend to be mutually exclusive. Metaphor is an
imaginative trope; it is only the similarity that defines
the relationship and the tenor need not be present (for
example, my steed waits in the driveway when the steed
stands in for an automobile) whereas in synecdoche, as in
metonymy, both elements must be physically present for the
relation to be perceived--with synecdoche, organically
present (for example, hand for worker/person). The organic
link of synecdoche implies the same proximic gap of
metonymy. If the two elements are seen to be independent,
there must be a point of division. The hand must end at a
certain point for it to be an independent object.
Extending his study of aphasia to literature, Jakobson
assigned lyric poetry and Romanticism to metaphor and epic
f"
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poetry and the realistic novel to metonymy (78). Later,
David Lodge popularized this scheme, insisting that literary
history could be described as a pendulum swinging back and
forth between metaphoric and metonymic styles (Working
12) .11 Jakobson's and Lodge's discussions lead to a polar
system in which one term, in this case metaphor, has been
privileged as a result of cultural assimilation (Jakobson,
Language 76) .
Leon Surette, Jill Matus, and Hugh Bredin critique this
bipolar system. Surette suggests that Jakobson's logic,
characteristic of the Prague School and Saussurian
structuralists, always falls onto a distinct but asymmetric
polar system which is open to later critique (558). Matus
also argues against the antagonistic view of the early
structuralists and suggests that removing the terms of
opposition would greatly increase the field for discussion
(313). She also counters de Man's idea that metonymy has
been neglected because it is the trope of chance. According
to Matus, metonymy depends on perceptions which are not
automatic or random; rather they are consciously made.
Perceptions of both similarity and contiguity are a product
of ~choice and creation" (310). Bredin critiques Jakobson
on two major points. First, in collapsing all speech into
two fundamental poles (selection and combination), Jakobson
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oversimplifies; he becomes too reductive and overdetermined.
The idea of contiguity is misleading and ~extensionally
bloated" (Bredin 93), covering everything that is not
similarity. Second, the two operations are not, as Jakobson
argues, independent; according to Bredin, selection and
combination occur together. This common-sensical view has
been accepted by most critics, including de Man, Jonathan
Culler, and Fredric Jameson. 12
Jakobson admitted in 1957 that the two tropes are
intertwined and ~any metonymy is slightly metaphoric and any
metaphor has a metonymic tint" (Language in Literature 85) .
There still, however, remains a decided emphasis on the
metaphoric in both Jakobson and linguistic studies. As
Jonathan Culler points out, there are conferences and
special journal issues on metaphor, but never on metonymy or
synecdoche (Pursuit of Signs 188).
Returning to the question of resemblance in stevens, I
would argue that resemblance is a metonymic relation, not a
metaphoric one. The distinction lies in the gulf between
language and reality. This underlying opposition
underscores much critical thought and the metaphor/metonymy
distinction brings it to the forefront. stevens appears to
be aware of this problem. He begins his essay ~Three
Academic Pieces," ~The accuracy of accurate letters is an
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accuracy with respect to the structure of reality" (NA 71) .
According to David Galef, he is announcing his intentions to
discuss the word and the object (589). stevens' statement
implies that reality as truth precedes language. Before
letters can be truth, they must be truthful to reality. One
use of language is to connect in some way with reality.
That it can never do this (always the gap between the
figural and the proper) causes problems and the precedence
of language emerges.
Metonymy as a linguistic phenomenon begins with naming;
like all tropes, it is the transfer of the name of one thing
to another. A direct link between word and object, between
signified and signifier has been debunked by thinkers from
Saussure to Derrida. This relationship, however, becomes
most significant in understanding stevens' reality and
imagination. Metonymic naming, to distinguish it from other
types of naming, occurs between two contiguous elements in a
contained system. If a metonymy is to exist (linguistically
since it is a verbal or written construct only), then the
two or more terms it treats must physically exist
simultaneously, in contiguous relation, like the beaver hat
and the grandfather in stevens' description of resemblance.
By being contiguous, they cannot coincide or substitute. In
essence they remain in relation to one another in what can
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be seen as an imaginary container just as the defining image
of metonymy includes container and contained existing in
proximic relation. Metonymy involves a precarious balance
between the two elements--as stevens notes in ~Notes Toward
a Supreme Fiction," ~not balances/That we achieve, but
balances that happen" (CP 386) .
However, one term precedes the other in the linguistic
conscious act, but not necessarily in the physical. 13
Temporality, as de Man claims, is a critical factor in
examining figurative tropes. There is a temporal transfer
between the two elements, causing one to be the origin (that
which is being named) and the other (which names the origin)
to be an Other. The relationship between the tenor and the
vehicle in metaphor, too, is temporal. In metaphor,
substitution ends with one term displacing the other. In a
simple metaphor, there is an equivalence. My car in the
metaphor of the steed was physically present first, but
linguistically and imaginatively, the steed displaces the
car. But metaphor works further: "my steed waits for me in
the Wal Mart parking lot." The difference is one between
levels of language and reality. Linguistically, the car is
identified with the steed and the car disappears (my steed
waits). In reality, the steed never exists; there is only
the car. The metaphoric steed is an imaginative creation.
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The difference is the completeness of the trope. Metaphor
insists that it is a complete substitution. Metonymy, on
the other hand, is a trope of incompleteness. The gap
between the two is the fact that the naming term cannot
substitute. With metonymy, however, the origin and the
metonym exist both physically and linguistically. The focus
is on the marginal, and the center is named only through the
marginal. The center is linguistically displaced because
the focus is now on the marginal which is still the marginal
because there is the center which the metonymy attempts to
name, but which it cannot name completely; in other words,
it cannot assume identity because it is always only defined
by proximity. It can only suggest identity and between the
simultaneous existence of the elements there is a gap which
cannot be crossed and whose existence implies desire. It is
metaphor's power to overrule the gap, but equally it is
metonymy's power to hold the two in abeyance.
As such, the center plays a significant role in
metonymy, but its ambiguity lies in the question of whether
it is present or not, or both. Sherri Williams discusses
the concept of the center as related to metonymy in an
article on Emily Dickinson and ~omitted centers." According
to Williams, the center, or focal object which is being
described, is lost, or using Williams' term, omitted, if
examined closely. Jakobson has also effectively described
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this situation of the center in a discussion of Boris
Pasternak. He uses Charles Chaplin's silent film A Woman of
Paris as an illustration:
Pasternak's lyricism... is imbued with metonymy;
in other words, it is association by contiguity
that predominates.... [N]o railway train can be
seen in Chaplin's A Woman of Paris, but we are
aware of its arrival from the reaction of the
people, images of the surrounding world function
as contiguous reflections, or metonymical
expression of the poet's self. (Language in
Literature 307)
In Chaplin's film, the focal object, the train, is never
seen, although it is the central object of attention. It is
only reflected through the effects it apparently causes.
steven Scobie describes a similar situation in Gertrude
Stein's Tender Buttons where metonymy is a way of naming the
character Alice, when Alice herself cannot be named (116).
Metonymic displacement causes the center (Alice) to be lost.
According to Scobie, the subject is at once present and
absent (112). It may also suggest that it is not a matter
of surface and depth, but only surface. Metonymy displaces
the idea of a hierarchy and the power of the single name
(Scobie 116). The same appears true of much of Stevens'
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poetry. If one term names the other, one term must be
somehow privileged for this to occur. In one sense, it is
the marginal that is privileged--the marginal names for the
center. In a metonymic figure with two items related by
proximity or contiguity, a sense of identity is exchanged
between the two, without ever having the identity completely
transferred. The central object, that which is the focus,
or which is being defined, is defined by the marginal
object. But metonymy subverts this by never clearly making
this identity; it is always only a part that attempts at
identification of the whole or a part that defines another
part. Metonymy's definition as container/contained elicits
a sense of unity wherein a center is present, but that unity
is never true; it is only an appearance. It is not a one-
to-one correspondence as is metaphor, but a many-to-one
correlation which offers more possibilities of
identification than available with metaphor.
As others suggest, metonymy as a trope demarginalizes
the marginalized; it ~champions the incidental" (Dickie 26).
As with stevens' problem of the sun, the sensory object
cannot, can never, be perceived; it can only be perceived by
the effects it causes or the marginal entities that reflect
the sun. Metonymy's center cannot be named. As Matus
argues, the marginal becomes central: in the process the
true center, the origin, is lost. But unlike the center in
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metaphor, which is never in question since it is the
metaphoric, in metonymy it still exists, both linguistically
and physically. If metaphor is an imaginative trope, then
that may be one reason stevens distrusts it so. The loss of
a center establishes desire for the center and intrinsically
related to the concept of the center is the gap. If a
metonymy is to exist, the gap between must remain uncrossed,
while at the same time, the purpose of metonymy is to name,
which I would argue is to cross that gap. M. Keith Booker,
in ~Notes Toward a Lacanian Reading of Wallace stevens,"
sums up that many critics recognize that desire is a major
impetus in stevens, as well as the knowledge of the futility
of the desire (494). The ability to come to terms with this
paradox is what separates metonymy from metaphor.
The purpose of this thesis is not to classify stevens
as a metonymic poet. To do so would be to ignore the
obvious and important metaphoric moments in his poetry. As
Hillis Miller remarks, it is ~impossible to find a single
one-dimensional theory of poetry and life in stevens" (~When
is a Primitive" 146). Rather, the purpose is to see how
metonymic moments in stevens' poetry suggest an impulse of
metonymic thinking in stevens that works in conjunction with
metaphor and how this conjunction is one of the causes of
the complexity inherent in stevens: why stevens resists
neat categories such as humanist, realist, or romantic. A
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fundamental difference between metaphor and metonymy is a
reliance on identity and definition on the one hand and
possibility on the other. Metaphor locks itself into its
inherent truth value, presupposing that it correctly
identifies. Metonymy does not presume to accurately
identify. It offers many alternatives to suggest the
intricacies of the subject, although this may lead to a
certain ambiguity. Jill Matus succinctly summarizes
metonymy's potential:
metonymies are neither definitive nor absolute;
they suspend sentence and make every formulation a
probation..•. [M]etonymy, by its open-ended,
accumulative nature, is more amenable to notions
of play than metaphor is. (310-311)
Metonymic thinking suggests an ideological shift away from a
totalizing metaphoric view toward one that recognizes and
embraces the knowledge of desire and the knowledge of the
futility of desire. The ability to contain these two




STEVENS' "ESSENTIAL POEM" AS THEORY
William C. Bevis describes "A Primitive Like an Orb" as
Stevens' "theoretical" later poem (295), and it is true that
Stevens' later poems tend to be more philosophical than the
earlier ones. 14 It is useful then to see how the ideas
developed in the later poems also work in the early lyrics.
A good case in point is "A Primitive Like an Orb" (1948) and
"Anecdote of the Jar" (1919). In "A Primitive Like an Orb"
Stevens clearly details his ideas about reality and
imagination which are intrinsic in the earlier poem.
Stevens begins "A Primitive Like an Orb" with the "the
essential poem at the center of things" (CP 440). Stevens
remarks that the essential poem is good, "an aria," but, at
the same time, it is a "gorging good,"15 and an aria made by
spiritual fiddling, connoting not only a "primitive" violin
music-making, but also aimless toying or manipulation of the
soul. The "slick-eyed nymphs" who fetch the essential poem
act like metaphor. Stevens distrusts the easy muse almost
as if perception by the senses is misleading, but it is
imaginative perception, not sensual perception, he is
referring to here. By referring to the essential poem as
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the ~essential gold," stevens associates it with the ~gold
flourisher" of ~Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," the
misnamed epithet of the unnameable sun, and thus, back to
the problem of naming. Here, too, the essential poem cannot
be seen and cannot be named, especially when carried forth
by ~such slight genii." Genii, like the slick-eyed nymphs,
are dangerous, mischievous spirits, often trapped by
containment of some sort (a lamp or a jar), who try to trick
their captors into releasing them. What does stevens mean
by primitive and orb, these two charged words, and how do
they resemble each other if they are like one another?
An orb commonly implies a spherical object or ball, but
may also be any of the concentric spheres in old astronomy
surrounding the earth and carrying the celestial bodies in
their revolutions, suggesting the idea of containment. The
orb brings out again the ever-recurring image of the sun
(another primal, centered source). Like the sun, the orb
cannot be properly perceived. Because it cannot be truly
seen, the implication remains that it can only be seen by
the effects or by contiguously related images. The orb,
then, is both the center and the surrounding margin, an
early sign that things are not as simple as they may seem.
stevens creates a paradoxical construct from the beginning.
A primitive can be several things, all of which are
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plausible knowing stevens' penchant for using a word's
second, third, or fourth dictionary meaning. 16 A primitive
is something basic, a root word, a core or center, or an
unsophisticated person or self-taught artist or an artist
who creates in an earlier form. Harold Bloom reads
primitive in terms of "first," as in the first idea (Poems
of our Climate 294) . A primitive is also reminiscent of
the base primitive jar and the ephebe of "Notes Toward a
Supreme Fiction."
Stevens argues that the essential cannot be known by
either the imaginative or the unimaginative primitive.
Imagination may seem to make known, but because it is
metaphoric, it is a false knowing. What then will make the
essential known? The poem is structured as a dialogue
between teacher and student, mentor and ephebe. The voice
of the narrator-persona is in the role of teacher or guide
and is evidenced by the "dear sirs" in the first stanza.
There is the sense that Stevens as the narrator is to
teach--to make known. The tone of "dear sirs" implies that
the audience is not a peer of the narrator. However, the
narrator-persona does identify with the audience by using
the inclusive "we." At the same time that the narrator is
able to teach, the narrator also places himself in the
position of ignorance along with the listeners.
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The desire of the student, or primitive, is to be like
an orb. A primitive is menial, but at the same time has the
ability to change, to grow, if taught. The orb, on the
other hand, is the highest idea of visible reality, but is
unreachable because of its location in another sphere and,
at the same time, unviewable because of its supremely
luminous essence. Connecting the primitive and the orb
suggests desire and longing. The simile ~like" promises
fulfillment, but the distance between the grounded primitive
and the astronomical orb is physically unfeasible. Linking
them together shows both the aspiration and the futility,
just as stevens desires the ability to name the essential
poem and simultaneously recognizes the futility of that
desire. Miller articulates it well in his reading of the
poem:
The interpreter [of the poem] is left with a
paradoxical space at once both interior and
exterior, objective and linguistic, a space of
elements organized as rotating rings around a
center that cannot be named or identified as such
and that is, moreover, not at the center at all
but ~eccentric," out beyond the periphery. (181)
The paradoxical space is the space of metonymy, the space
metaphor elides in its push for identity. It is metonymy's
ability to suspend both spaces or units together, intact,
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that raises it above metaphor. Metonymy has the ability to
obviate the subject and object, uniting them, but at the
same time keeping their separate identities and negating
neither.
stevens never questions the existence of the essential
poem; he assumes its existence from the beginning. still
the question remains of how to name it. Simile fails, as
does metaphor, because Stevens recognizes the inherent
falsity of the tropes. In the second section of the poem, a
metonymic sense of identity becomes apparent in the line,
~We do not prove the existence of the poem/It is something
sensed and known in lesser poems." Lesser poems, poems
written in this reality, reflect what we know of the
essential poem, again a Platonic idea. stevens identifies
the coming awareness of the essential poem in a metaphor of
a harmony, but a harmony ~that sounds/A little and a little,
suddenly." It is knowledge that takes the perceiver by
surprise. Composed of disparate elements, the perception of
the whole comes slowly. Stevens also points out the
sensuality of the transfer: ~it is something sensed" just
as the harmony is audibly heard. Terry Eagleton describes
the child finding its identity in Lacan's mirror stage:
~The image in the mirror both is and is not itself, a
blurring of subject and object obtains--it has begun the
process of constructing a centre of self" (164). Stevens
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describes the harmony of the orb thus: ~It is and it/Is not
and, therefore, is." Later, in stanza VI he describes the
world personified into the mate of summer with ~her mirror
and her look denouncing separate selves, both one." Does
the existence of the unity depend on the elements?
According to stevens, no. The harmony is its own existence
separate from the constituents; as in metonymy, the two
elements have their own existence. Floyd Merrell discusses
how two ~boundaried spaces" remain intact in a metonymic
structure. But stevens ends the section with the instant of
speech, ~The breadth of an accelerando moves,/Captives the
being, widens--and was there." Significantly, stevens does
not state that it is there, but rather was there. We do not
and cannot ever know the moment. We attempt to name it, but
cannot; naming is futile as evidenced also in the
sun/Phoebus problem of ~Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction."
In this case, and in the case with the central poem and
the world mentioned above, the ~as if" and the ~like"
assigned to simile act more to identify equivalence than
resemblance. The question stevens raises is how the
essential poem is known or identified and the answer lies in
metonymy. Appearances are misleading: ~It is/As if the
central poem became the world,/And the world the central
poem" (CP 441). The attempt at simile, as before, here with
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the ~as if" (what Vendler refers to as the ~qualified
assertion") fails. Instead of the direct relation of ~as,"
it is now ~as if." stevens questions the power of simile,
and those that read the trope as simile overlook the tone of
uncertainty the if places on the line. The shift from
simile (and metaphor) is a shift toward reality, away from
the imaginative construct stevens disdains. The ~used-to
earth" of reality has no influence--it is only when ~the
men, earth and sky inform/Each other" that a new Reality is
gleaned. It requires a conjunction of contiguous elements
seen in context for the new reality to be apparent. It is,
however, the elements of this original reality that inform
the new reality. Daniel Schwarz, in Narrative and
Representation in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, notes the
shift in Stevens:
as Stevens aged, the particular, the thing itself
becomes the dominant interest....The
distinction between signifier and signified
changes. Metaphor--the trope of idealism,
including Platonism gives way to metonymy--the
trope of Aristotelianism. (220)
Like Aristotle, Stevens rejects the ambiguity of metaphor,
relying more on sensation, or intuition, than even reason,
or in Stevens' terms, the imagination. 17 This is apparent
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not only as stevens aged, however. It is there from the
beginning. The seeming confluence of Plato and stevens
appears symptomatic of the problem with stevens.
The shift toward reality is reflected in the way
stevens words the poem, and the articles in ~A Primitive
Like an Orb" are significant to interpreting the
implications of reality and imagination. A primitive and an
orb are not the same as the primitive and the orb, just as
the essential poem is not the same as an essential poem.
The title announces a primitive like an orb, but begins with
the essential poem. stevens offers the representative to
identify the specific, an offering that he knows is
incomplete. Hillis Miller points out the same implication
by juxtaposing the poem with a passage from Jacques
Derrida's Of Grammatology. Summarizing Derrida's discussion
of the metaphor of the heliotrope, Miller concludes:
by the fact that it [any word] is only a term, a
word, it is not the word. It is only a derived
image in a potentially endless sequence of images,
each of which always refers to another image,
an[d] so on indefinitely. (169)
We return to linearity and to metonymy as a movement or
direction in Stevens' poetry and as a way to make things
known. The poem is based upon a linear sequence of
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renamings, emphasized in stanza three as the poem trails off
into ellipses:
A space grown wide, the inevitable blue
of secluded thunder, an illusion, as it was,
Oh as, always too heavy for the sense
To seize, the obscurest, as the distant was.
The gap of metonymy appears again as the "space grown
wide"; it is the space between the abstract and the
physical--the gap which the imagination attempts to cross.
It is as if stevens cannot stop the forward motion of his
quest. stevens again begins a list when he ventures on
naming the essential poem in section VIII:
A vis, a principle or, it may be,
The meditation of a principle,
Or else an inherent order active to be
Itself, a nature to its natives all
Beneficence, a repose, utmost repose,
The muscles of a magnet aptly felt,
A giant...
In this effort to name the noun of naming, stevens lists
nine alternatives, a vis, a principle, a meditation, an
order, a nature, a repose, an utmost repose, muscles, and
culminates in the giant. The linear progression is crucial
because it never ends; it offers itself as only suggestion
or possibility. It is also a deferral, never the thing
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itself--a situation that elicits desire. The giant is on
the horizon which insists that there is something beyond
that which the giant is.
Derrida writes in Of Grammatology of the chain of
supplements, which seems an appropriate and useful analogy.
In ~Repetitions of a Young Captain" (ca. 1945), stevens
discusses what constitutes reality and notes that ~A few
words of what is real or may be/Or of glistening reference
to what is real,/The universe that supplements the manque."
The manque could refer to either the primitive or the jar as
something with unrealized potential. It is the poet's task
to ~supplement" it, and what the poet has to supplement it
with is language, ~a few words," which are only signifiers
~of glistening reference." Just as the ellipses continue
the poem ad infinitum, Derrida's supplements continue
indefinitely:
Through this sequence of supplements a necessity
is announced: that of an infinite chain,
ineluctably multiplying the supplementary
mediations that produce the sense of the very
thing they defer: the mirage of the thing itself,
of immediate presence, or originary perception.
Immediacy is derived. (157)
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All this begins, Derrida notes, with what is ~inconceivable
to reason" (157). According to Derrida, the supplement is
dangerous in that it leads away from nature. This is
emphasized by the statement that the thing itself is only a
~mirage," an illusion. Language is a supplement to nature,
to replace the thing itself. Derrida widens his argument to
include all sign systems, stating that the sign is always
the ~supplement to the thing itself" (145). In fact, there
has never been anything outside the text: ~the absolute
present...ha[sJ already escaped, ha[s] never existed"
(159). stevens then is playing with something dangerous, a
possible reason he stops himself with the ellipses, although
ellipses themselves signify that there is something else,
just as the giant on the horizon does. There is the urge
toward presence in stevens, however, which cannot be left
alone. This urge toward presence is an urge toward Reality.
By eliciting as many instances as possible, there is a
chance the center, Reality, may be known. Derrida argues
that as one continues to progress from resemblance to
resemblance it implies the possibility of getting closer.
stevens would agree, although he recognizes that he can
never reach the center.
still the question remains how to grasp the essential
poem. The sound of the statement ~here then" announces the
certainty, as if the speaker has the answer. That answer is
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an ~abstraction given head," physicallized, or in the words
of another poem, ~an abstraction blooded." stevens attempts
to get at the most physical. Neil Easterbrook notes a
similar instance in William Carlos Williams, arguing that
~This is just to say" ~isolates... raw experience....No
symbol, no metaphor, no trope, but literally the objects
themselves" (32). Even though Easterbrook places stevens in
opposition to Williams, stevens, too, insists on the raw
experience. He defines the abstract by physicalizing it
into the giant. The giant is the center, ~at the center of
the horizon, concentrum." Everything revolves around the
giant, ~whirroos/And scintillant sizzlings...Moving around
and behind." Not only is the giant the center, but it is
the origin or the source--even more, it predates the origin,
being the patron of origins. The essential poem, the poem
most basic, most primitive, is at the center; it is the
source and the focal object, but it is clear that this
center cannot be seen by stevens as evidenced by the
frustrated ellipses, so he creates the giant as an apparent
metaphor.
stevens first uses the giant in what could be
considered his war poems, ~Gigantomachia" and ~Repetitions
of a Young Captain," both from Transport to Summer published
in 1947. 18 Possibly as a response to the war, stevens
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creates the giant to gird himself against the fragmentation
he perceives resulting from the war. In "Gigantomachia"
soldiers who look at the war non-metaphorically, in order
"to strip off the complacent trifles, ITo expel the ever
present seductions, ITo reject the script for its lack-
tragic, ITo confront with plainest eye," are able to "become
a giant," and hence are able to transcend the horror of war
by pure perception, foregoing the falsity of metaphor.
Similarly, "Repetitions of a Young Captain" deals with
the new reality caused by the war: "The giant of sense
remains/A giant without a body. If, as giant,/He shares a
gigantic life, it is because/The gigantic has a reality of
its own." The senses are directly related to the
physicality of reality. If the sun is the bodiless half,
then the giant coalesces all that is of the body, all that
is sensual.
The giant becomes a focal element of "Notes Toward a
Supreme Fiction" as major man, the MacCullough, and as the
"thinker of the first idea." As major man the giant is
abstract, which is an important element in Stevens'
conception of reality. Stevens notes in section ten of "It
Must Be Abstract" that "The major abstraction is the idea of
man/And the major man is its exponent, abler/ln the abstract
than in his singular" (388). The paradox in Stevens
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continues as the more abstract stevens becomes, the closer
to a central reality he is.
But the giant is not the center; it is not a metaphor.
In ~A Primitive Like an Orb" the giant is on the horizon, a
metonymic figure linearly spread out. Additionally, the
giant is a mediatory term. According to Kronick, without
the giant, immediacy and a oneness with nature would result
(94). The giant is not the end product; it is part of an
evolution, not what stevens desires. stevens describes a
process. The giant is always what is evolved, but also
always what will change. There is no beginning or end to
the process. The appositives in the series are equivalent.
Each is formed from a resemblance of the previous idea and a
resemblance from that idea goes on to form the next. There
is not a center--there is no depth. stevens deals only with
surfaces. Miller notes that the structure of the poem
mirrors the ~serial arrangement of image organized in a
circular structure around an absent center" (167); the
structure is that of a clock with its twelve stanzas. A
clock implies a center, but with a clock, as with this poem,
we are not concerned with the center. Instead, the focus is
on the fringes, just as stevens is ultimately concerned with
the fringes of the poem (and reality). The giant cannot be
seen because of the ~whiroos" surrounding it and blocking
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the view; rather we see it as a metonymic sign of something
on the horizon.
stevens ends the poem with ~That's it." Either a
pointing sign to the object of the poem, or a statement of
resignation, or possibly both: that is all that he can do.
stevens objectifies the abstract by invoking the senses:
touch, sight, and hearing--~The lover writes, the believer
hears,\The poet mumbles and the painter sees." The sensual
abilities are the bases of reality and the knowledge of
one's relation to it. Even here stevens shies away from a
totalizing figure; instead, it is a more metonymic figure
delineated by distinct particulars. stevens notes that each
is a part, separate but whole: ~Each one, his fated
eccentricity, lAs a part, but part, but tenacious particle."
The part is a sign of an other, an Other of the totality,
~the totallOf letters, prophecies, perceptions, clods of
color."
stevens' desire in ~A Primitive Like an Orb" and most
of his poems is to make things known, to name the
unnameable, be it the Sun or the essential poem, or even
more 50, intertwined with these terms, Reality. Metaphor is
the easy way to name the abstract--to substitute something
already known for the unknowable, but stevens realizes that
this is not truly naming, that metaphor is false. Metaphor
clouds and loses the abstract with the substitution of the
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metaphoric term for the abstract. Metaphor is a totalizing
figure in that the metaphor becomes a center to its own
system. stevens recognizes the lack of a way to name the
abstract. Much of the complexity in stevens results from
the juxtaposition of the abstract, the unnameable, with the
physical. He therefore culminates with the ~giant of
nothingness" as the final statement of the series of the
total. An oxymoronic ending, combining the giant with
nothing. But it must be remembered that the giant is only
an attempt, a partial attempt at best, to name; it is one




STEVENS' JAR AS METONYMY
"Your trouble, Wallace, is that you
write about--bric-a-brac."
--Robert Frost to Wallace Stevens
Stevens' 1919 poem "Anecdote of the Jar" is one of his
most well-known and anthologized poems. Its seemingly
simplistic, but simultaneously ambiguous, appearance invites
critical attention. Every major critical work on Stevens
must and has, if only passingly, turned its attention to
this little poem. Reflective of Stevens criticism as a
whole, criticism on "Anecdote of the Jar" has ranged over a
variety of approaches and reached a number of conclusions.
A metonymic reading of the poem shows how the poem addresses
the underlying issues of reality and imagination and
confronts the problem of metaphor.
Romantic readings of the poem focus on the jar and
ascribe to it a transcendent, metaphoric value. 19 They
comment on how the jar acts as an ordering agent by
juxtaposing the jar with the wilderness, and suggest that
the jar is a metaphor for Stevens' rage for order. Frank
Kermode describes the poem in these metaphoric terms: "jar
as symbol of fixed, orderly and dead, within natural,
diffuse and live landscape." In his book Wallace Stevens'
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Supreme Fiction: A New Romanticism, Joseph Carroll remarks
that the jar ~serves as an extension of the poet's own drive
to order" (36); for Carroll, the jar corresponds to the
Romantic notion of the inner self aligning with the external
world. Yvor Winters, in the Anatomy of Nonsense, is one of
the earliest critics to cite the Romantic identification of
the jar as art and to interpret the poem as describing how
art corrupts nature. Patricia Merivale agrees with Winters
but claims that the jar is a transposed Keatsean Grecian
urn, and that the poem mocks the death of Romanticism.
Early on, the debate was evident as the editors of The
Explicator argued that Winters' reading seemed forced. The
poem, according to them, is a statement of aesthetics and
imagination. However, the poem is not to be accorded the
~validity or status of a philosophical conclusion." The
implication is that this early poem is slight in comparison
with other, later works. I maintain, however, that
~Anecdote of the Jar" contains all the complexity of
stevens' later works.
Alison Ensor and John William Corrington resist
partially the impulse to metaphorize the jar. Both discuss
the jar in terms of its ambivalence. For one, Ensor refutes
the argument that the word Tennessee refers to a specific
place or event, such as the Fugitive poets at Vanderbilt or
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the Tennessee Valley Authority dam project, and that the
poem then is a social commentary.20 It is not a
specifically political allegory. She concludes that both
the jar and Tennessee are based in uncertainty--Stevens both
praises and damns them. Corrington makes an important shift
by emphasizing the presence of the narrator-persona and
moving the activity of the poem into the mind of the
narrator. Corrington refutes Riddel's and others' claim
that the tension exists between art and nature symbolized by
the jar and the wilderness. Corrington states that the
tension exists only in the mind of the narrator. While
Corrington does argue that the jar represents (synonymous
with metaphor and symbol in this instance) the metaphorical
act, he concludes that the poem ends with a realization of
the irresolvable dilemma--"wholeness is forever sought,
never to be realized" (51) .21
However, the jar is not an allegory or a metaphor.
stevens never attempts any metaphoric implications in the
poem. It is helpful to quote the poem in its entirety:
I placed a jar in Tennessee,
And round it was, upon a hill.
It made the slovenly wilderness
Surround that hill.
The wilderness rose up to it,
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And sprawled around, no longer wild.
The jar was round upon the ground
And tall and of a port in air.
It took dominion everywhere.
The jar was gray and bare.
It did not give of bird or bush,
Like nothing else in Tennessee.
First, stevens clearly defines the poem as an anecdote in
the title. That he uses the term anecdote often in titles
is significant because it announces the marginal nature of
what follows. 22 In Ariel and the Police, Frank Lentricchia
relates the marginal nature of the jar to the whole notion
of anecdote. Discussing anecdote as representation,
Lentricchia states the following:
[An anecdote] apparently stands in for a bigger
story, a socially pivotal and culturally pervasive
biography which it illuminates--in an anecdotal
flash it reveals the essence of the larger
unspoken story. (3)
While Lentricchia's reading politicizes the jar, taking the
unspoken story to be a politically social one, a criticism
of literary and social history (20), his focus on the
incidental and marginal are well taken. It is the function
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of the jar as marginal to suggest, while not directly
stating the identity of the center. As Lentricchia puts it,
the anecdote gives the "essence" but not the actual thing
itself.
stevens also avoids ascribing metaphoric value to the
jar by noting that the jar resists substitution. W.J.T.
Mitchell argues that the author does not make the jar but
only places it (707), eliding over the fact of its
manufacture, seeing it somehow as an essential nature. It
is as basic as stevens can get. stevens could have selected
anything as the focal point of the poem, but he decided to
use the container image of the jar. The word itself is an
interesting choice, as "jar" connotes baseness, not an
abstraction or an ornate figure. The sound of the word
indicates an abrupt shaking, as in "to jar," as if stevens
is attempting to shock the reader into realizing that this
is something different. It is not a vase or an urn, but
rather a simple jar, in stevens' mind an "American" object.
The baseness of the jar, the object he selects, implies that
it is a reality untouched by the imagination, non-altered,
just the basic reality. This is where stevens' concept of
the imagination differs from the Romantics'; Keats' Grecian
urn, for example, is clearly not the same as stevens' jar.
The jar is simplistic, not a "meaningless chaos of
sense impressions" (Johnson 30), but like the poem, it is
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deceptive. It does not become part of the wilderness. The
jar will not replace the wilderness or the hill. The focus
of the poem is the whole context of the jar along with the
hill, the wilderness, Tennessee, and the narrator. What
results is a vertical pile-up, a metonymic chain.
Verticality, the common purview of metaphor, is undercut
here in that the poem describes a pile-up, and thus the
elements will not substitute as metaphor would do. The jar
and the wilderness never come into contact; there is only
movement upward, and they remain separate. Each element
becomes related to the other, not by any sense of identity
or resemblance, but by their contiguous relation. That
stevens' metonymic figure is vertical, instead of
horizontal, suggests stevens is questioning metonymy's
traditional formulation. stevens shifts the structure from
a horizontal axis leading off into infinity to a structure
based partly on the idea of the horizon. He suggests that
more so than even a figure composed of a center surrounded
by contiguous objects, his metonymic structure is a figure
which partakes of the horizon. The distinction between the
subject and object is marked by their being on either side
of the horizon with the mediating metonymic term on the
horizon. The subject and object are forever separated by
the gap formed by the horizon.
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Not only is there a gap physically between the
elements, there is also a gap that does not allow identity.
Attempting to bridge this gap, the romantics transform the
jar into a metaphor for order, effacing the jar in the
process. However, the jar is not effaced. As marginal, the
jar maintains its own unique existence and identity. The
jar is the jar--stevens insists on its reality with the
insistent declaration of its existence by the use of
identificative statements: the jar "was round," the jar
"was gray," and the jar "did not give of bird or bush." The
jar does not become part of the wilderness: the wilderness
around the jar only "rose up to it." It is in this space
between the contiguous elements, between the jar and the
wilderness, and the jar and narrator, that there is lack
where a desire for metaphor would be manifested. There is
no substitution and no metaphor. By creating the jar as
metaphor, stevens would lose the sense of reality of the
jar; it would become something else, a deceptive metaphor.
This tension, between substitution and contiguity, is a key
tension in stevens.
The third way stevens subverts metaphor is through a
close examination of the center. stevens is ambivalent
about the place of the center in "Anecdote of the Jar." The
image of a center appears repeatedly in stevens' poetry.
63
Thomas F. Walsh, in his Concordance to the Poetry of Wallace
Stevens, cites eighty-seven references to the words
~center," ~centre," and ~central." With the synonyms
~core," ~essence," ~essential," quintessence," ~epitome,"
~core," ~earth," ~nave," ~axis," ~pivot," ~converge,"
~clou," ~nuclear," and ~concentrum" the total comes to 205.
While not so prevalent in Harmonium, the image of the center
becomes more and more common later. The most explicit
example from Harmonium is ~Life is Motion." Here the center
or the central focus of action is the stump: "Bonnie and
Jose,/Dressed in calico,/Danced around a stump" (CP 83), an
interesting choice for a center, the castrated, lacking
stump. Various critics have seen the center as important to
stevens. According to James Baird in The Dome and the Rock,
~always it is the center which is sought" (108). The search
for a center becomes a metaphor for stevens' poetry,
characterized by such words as ~voyage," "seeking," and
~search."23 Isabel McCaffrey notes that ~stevens' voyage
toward the possible... is also a voyage to the center"
(611), and Joseph Carroll discusses stevens' poetics in
terms of seeking (3). McCaffrey implies that stevens'
search is for the real by using the term ~possible."
Northrop Frye describes this aspect of stevens as related to
William Blake: ~Perhaps stevens, like Blake, has so far
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only given us the end of a golden string, and after
traversing the circle of natural images we have still to
seek the center" (70). Frye suggests a tenuous link with
the Romantics, which would lend Frye's reading then to a
metaphoric reading, but the image of the center suggests a
metonymic possibility: we never get to the ~thing itself."
About the idea of searching for a center, stevens wrote in a
letter to Sister M. Bernetta Quinn, who was on the faculty
of the College of st. Teresa, Winona, Minnesota:
I don't want to turn to stone under your very eyes
by saying 'This is the centre that I seek and this
alone.' Your mind is too much like my own for it
to seem to be an evasion on my part to say merely
that I do seek a centre and expect to go on
seeking it. I don't say that I shall not find it
or that I do not expect to find it. It is the
great necessity even without specific
identification. (L 584)
For something to be central demands something other to
surround or contain it. Containment creates a system, a
context of all elements. The initial level of containment
in ~Anecdote of the Jar" is the hill surrounding the jar.
The placement of the word round in the second line acts with
double meaning, implying both the roundness of the jar and
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the circular geometry of the hill. The poem exudes a round
circular image with round appearing several more times
throughout the poem: round (line 1), surround (line 4),
around (line 6), round and ground (line 7).
Around the hill, stevens places the wilderness ~to
surround the hill" as the second level of containment. For
most readers, the poem remains at this level, distinguishing
the connection between the wilderness and the jar. Even
more than this, the state of Tennessee surrounds all three:
the wilderness, the hill, and the jar. Being an arbitrary
abstraction, the concept of Tennessee as a state is a man-
made construction, like the jar. Both of these are an
ordering, an act of man's imagination, and can be possibly
read as an effort to contain. Tennessee surrounds not only
the elements of the poem but also the poem itself. The word
Tennessee brackets the poem, appearing in the first and the
last lines. Essentially all of the words in the poem are
contained between the two instances of the word Tennessee
(only the first five, ~I placed a jar in," remain outside).
The ~I" is outside the context, but contiguous with it. It
is indeed the instigator, the cause of the system, for it
injects the jar into the previously closed system.
In an attempt to bring the jar to the center, to give
structure to the poem, and to satisfy his rage for order,
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stevens remarks that the jar dominates: ~it took dominion
everywhere." Roy Harvey Pearce deduces that the jar is a
fruit jar, a ~Dominion Wide Mouth Special," (~Iconological
Note" 65), an obvious play on the word ~dominion" from the
poem itself. If Pearce's assumption is correct, then the
transparency of the glass clearly exhibits its emptiness,
although the greyness of a Dominion Wide Mouth Special jar
also suggests a sense of translucence which would tend to
hide the contents. Stevens indicates the lack of a center,
but also clouds that indication with this choice of subject.
At the same time that the poem is constructed around
increasing levels of containment, then, what would be
considered the center, the jar, itself hides the center.
The jar as a container is only an empty one; not only is it
base, but it is incomplete. By foregrounding the object,
Stevens establishes it as privileged reality, and the real
becomes the center in stevens' poetry. stevens claims this
center as a non-metaphorical center, but by the end of the
poem, he realizes it is not a center. In ~Anecdote of the
Jar," the word was in line 7 is the actual center of the
poem (excluding the title), not jar. One word before was,
however, is jar. Contiguous with the center, the jar is
just off center, the climax of the poem and thematically the
central part. 24 In the line before, the wilderness becomes
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~no longer wild" and the jar can dominate. As the poem
concludes, however, the jar is reduced by its being ~grey
and bare" and by the fact that it ~did not give of bird or
bush." Also, as noted above, the first appearance of the
word jar in the poem's first line appears outside the
bracket of Tennessee. Other than the first occasion of the
word, the word itself only appears two more times.
Elsewhere it is referred to as it. Its no longer being
mentioned by name might imply that the jar truly exists
outside the frame of containment.
If the jar is not a metaphor, what is it? Most readers
focus on the jar, just as they focus on the giant at the end
of ~A Primitive Like an Orb." But the giant is not the end
of the process--there is not a beginning or an end to the
process as the appositive structure of the poem suggests.
Likewise, the jar is only part of a system: the other
elements, the hill, the wilderness, Tennessee, and the
narrator-persona are also involved. Taken together, they
inform each other, as stevens declares must happen in ~A
Primitive Like an Orb." The jar is empty and ~does not give
of bird or bush," but when placed in conjunction with the
wilderness, it partakes of some sense of dominance.
Likewise, the wilderness is chaotic on its own, but with the
jar it is ~no longer wild." It gains a sense of order.
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Even the ~I" is informed by the context. The ~I" is the
instigator of the system, and has a metonymic relation to
the jar, the wilderness, and Tennessee. Because the ~I" can
place the jar, it has a structural importance to the
contextual creation. Each part is a part of the whole.
Together they create a harmony.
However, a problem arises. Just as stevens becomes
definite, he undercuts his own statement. When the jar
comes to dominate, stevens remarks that ~It took dominion
everywhere." The next line is ~The jar was grey and bare."
The jar's dominion is short-lived. By its physical nature
alone, the jar is nothing--base, empty, nothing; it is only
a jar. In the gap between these lines, stevens subverts the
jar's avowed dominance and power. The jar is man-made, like
the state of Tennessee, and it has an origin, an Other that
precedes it. It is the ~I" which is the initial ordering
agent, the ~I" that places the jar in Tennessee. This agent
is another centering urge in the poem, but the ~I" in the
poem is also part of the poem that is not contained in the
bracket of Tennessee; it too has been omitted, or displaced.
The wilderness sprawled around. As some critics suggest,
the wilderness never loses its chaotic, slovenly nature.
Only with the jar does it have an order, but it is only an
imaginative one, created by a conjunction between the jar
and the wilderness.
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For stevens the conception of reality is a problem.
The jar is empty and does not contain what stevens desires.
It is a center that stevens cannot reach, only one he can
desire, a fragile desire that cannot be met. He makes the
significant difference in the title and the rest of the
poem, similar to what he does in "A Primitive Like an Orb."
In the title, it is the jar, whereas in the poem, it is a
jar. 25 It is a difference between specificity and
generality, or model and exemplum. stevens desires to
locate the jar, the essential reality, but to do so he can
only describe a jar, an example of reality which may
correspond with Reality. By emphasizing the apparent
centeredness of the jar and then unmasking it, he leaves a
gap, the gap between the jar and a jar. By locating the
gap, stevens emphasizes the lack of a jar to represent the
jar, leaving only a jar as the poetic material, which for
stevens is an appropriate situation.
When Robert Frost charges stevens with writing about
bric-a-brac, he is actually aptly describing stevens'
poetics. Bric-a-brac--ephemeral, marginal, cluttered
items--is what fills stevens' poems. stevens does not focus
on things. Instead, he focuses on the marginal: the long
lists of appositives, the multiple ways of naming something,
the many attempts to elicit the essence of Reality. stevens
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knows he cannot directly name the thing, that is, Reality--
it is beyond the reality in which he exists. The "seem" of
naming, especially metaphoric naming, is disdainful to
stevens, so he suffices to live with that knowledge. As he
states in "The Emperor of Ice Cream" "Let be be finale of
seem" (CP 64). By enumerating metonymic instances, he does
not give in to the metaphoric impulse to exist in an
imaginative construct that he knows to be false. Instead,




lThis line along with the headnote to chapter four is
from a conversation between Wallace stevens and Robert Frost
that took place in Key West, Florida, February, 1940, as
reported by Lawrence Thompson in Robert Frost: The Years of
Triumph 1915-1938, p.66S-666. Thompson notes that he heard
stevens make ~half-playful, half-serious complaints" against
Frost's poetry (666).
stevens and Frost met several times in Florida, as well
as in Connecticut. Thompson cites a reminiscence of Robert
Bartlett concerning stevens' and Frost's relationship:
Robert Frost told a story of an evening, much of a
night, spent in Florida with a New Englander,
vice-president of a big Connecticut insurance
company, but also a poet--kept the two lives
absolutely separate....The vice president-poet
drank heavily at dinner, offended by making passes
at the waitresses, and in the hotel room was very
drunk....The next day he remembered nothing
whatever of what had happened....Seen in
Connecticut at a later date, the vice-president
rather shamefacedly had referred to the Florida
episode. Down there he drank--never at home; but
his countenance belied his statement. Robert
Frost rather liked the man in some ways. (665-
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666)
2This adulterated reality may be a symptom of the
common theme of sexual perversion in modernist literature
also exhibited by writers such as D.H. Lawrence and by T.S.
Eliot in ~The Waste Land."
3B.J. Leggett, in the introduction to her study,
Wallace Stevens and Poetic Theory, states the ambiguity as
follows:
stevens is the poet of the imagination; he is the
poet of reality. He is the doctrinal poet of
ideas; he is the poet of words, less concerned
with doctrine than with feeling. He is a
Symbolist; he stands opposed to the Symbolist and
post-Symbolist poets. He belongs to an idealist
tradition; he belongs to a naturalistic tradition.
He has shown no major change in growth, so that
his late poems partake of the same sensibility and
the same intellectual climate as his early verse;
he exhibits a great change in sensibility and a
major change in growth from the early to the late
poems. He works through a dialectical process
from thesis to antithesis to synthesis; his poetry
is not dialectical in any Hegelian sense. His
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private symbolism is consistent throughout his
poetry; his symbols such as the sun and moon, blue
and green, do not always mean the same thing. His
poet-hero is not a human individual but an
abstraction who does not exist in our world; his
hero is always the human individual, and he may be
any man who exists among his fellows in a mythless
age. (3)
4It is a "well-worn path," according to Leonard and
Wharton (1).
~ost of the recent scholarship on stevens includes
some sort of survey of the diverse and changing reaction to
stevens' poetry. Of these, the most useful include Melita
Schaum's Wallace Stevens and the Critical Schools and steven
Gould Axelrod and Helen Deese's introduction to their 1988
volume, Critical Essays on Wallace Stevens. Although an
earlier work, Joseph Riddell's essay "Contours of Stevens'
Criticism" is also valuable. Writing at the end of Stevens'
life, Riddel prophecies a stevens industry to come. His
choice of the word "contours" in the title of the review
essay establishes a metaphor that aptly describes the ups
and downs of stevens' critical reception and understanding.
What I have attempted in this first chapter is only a
representative sample of the major critics of Stevens. A
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full survey of the critical scholarship is beyond the scope
of this study. John Serio's annotated bibliography of
Stevens criticism is the most valuable reference work for
Stevens study that has recently appeared.
6Serio's bibliography and Melita Schaum's book, as well
as Abbie Willard's earlier review, create a similar
narrative.
7Although Vendler's book has been well-received by
many, it has also been under scrutiny. Paul Bove has
discussed her ironic reading of Stevens as discrediting the
Romantic impulse. Bove's critique progresses from seeing
her as too New Critical. He writes this charge:
Vendler's view of Stevens' poems as circles
gathering 'beginning to end' and apotheosizing
themselves as Absolute Images of verbal purity is
the result of a circular argument which stems from
the sedimented, reified, covered-over habits of
reading Modern texts from a New Critical point of
view. (184)
See also Joseph Riddel's critique ~Interpreting Stevens: An
Essay on Poetry and Thinking."
aFar a further discussion of the sun as metaphor,
especially in terms of the heliotrope, see Jacques Derrida's
essay ~White Mythology." For a discussion of Derrida's
works, in terms of the heliotrope, see Rael Meyerowitz's
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~The Uncanny Sun" in Hebrew University Studies in Literature
and Patricia Parker's ~The Motive for Metaphor: Stevens and
Derrida" in The Wallace Stevens Journal.
9In contrast to Bump, Stuart Peterfreund states that
the goal of science from the seventeenth century to the
nineteenth century had as its purpose the understanding of
natural cause and effect in order to reassert Adamic power
and forge a closer relationship with the divine as first
cause. Peterfreund argues that the metonymic was the best
approach to this power (66). Peterfreund's formulation of
metonymy, however, derived from Abrams, Vico and Umberto
Eco, suggests metonymy is causative as well as substitutive.
Metaphor, on the other hand, is contextual. This argument,
I would counter, takes its precedence from assuming that
language precedes reality.
lOWillard Bohn's ~Roman Jakobson's Theory of Metaphor
and Metonymy: An Annotated Bibliography" is a valuable
survey of the criticism employing these terms. It does,
however, leave out several articles appearing after its
publication in 1984, including Leon Surette's ~Metaphor and
Metonymy: Jakobson Reconsidered," Barbara Johnson's
~Metaphor, metonymy and voice in Their Eyes Were Watching
God," and Jill Matus' ~Proxy and Proximity: Metonymic
Signing."
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llThe Modes of Modern Writing contains Lodge's best
discussion of metonymy, including a schematicized table



































12See De Man, Allegories of Reading; Culler, Pursuit of
Signs; and Jameson, The Political Unconscious.
13For further discussion along these lines, see Floyd
Merrel's discussion of the process in Semiotic Foundations:
Steps toward an Epistemology of Written Texts (esp. 52-54).
Merrel uses the construction of "boundaried spaces" as
semiotic units, and sees metaphor as a contraction of two
boundaried spaces, which results in negation. Metonymy, on
the other hand, is considered as an expansion as the two
boundaried spaces can coexist.
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14Many discussions of stevens utilize the shorter
lyrics such as ~Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,"
~Earthy Anecdote," ~Emperor of Ice Cream," and ~Anecdote of
the Jar" to establish basic issues that are expanded in
later, longer poems. Teaching Wallace Stevens: Practical
Essays, edited by John N. Serio and B.J. Leggett, contains
many accounts of the practice of prefacing the longer poems
with the shorter poems. In her contribution, for example,
Helen Vendler suggests teaching a long poem together with a
short poem having similar subjects, such as ~Sunday Morning"
and ~Ploughing on Sunday" (7). Milton J. Bates' problem is
deciding on which poem to first confront students with; he
has considered ~short" poems such as ~Anecdote of the Jar,"
~The Snow Man," and ~Earthy Anecdote," but considers ~The
Emperor of Ice Cream" the best (18-19). Finally, James C.
Ransom's teaching of ~Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction"
assumes a familiarity with the shorter lyrics (74-75).
Reversing this approach, however, works just as well, and it
is useful to note how the issues elaborated on in the longer
poems work in the shorter poems.
15The gorging adjective is one of the few gustatory
images in Stevens that I have noticed. The poem ~Someone
puts a Pineapple on the Table" from ~Three Academic Pieces"
printed in The Necessary Angel, is one that does include the
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sense of smell. There is a decided emphasis on the senses,
but it is usually sight, hearing, or touch, not taste or
smell.
The title of stevens' poem ~Frogs Eat Butterflies.
Snakes Eat Frogs. Hogs Eat Snakes. Men Eat Hogs" (CP 78)
does suggest a certain carnivorous attitude. The ever-
increasing levels of containment, or in this case,
consumption, is an interesting turn on the idea of
containing which raises several questions. Does the act of
eating/containing alter or transform the thing(s) eaten? Is
there a basic reality in the middle of all of the
~containers?"
16In his oral biography of Stevens, Peter Brazeau
includes remarks by several assistants at the Hartford
Insurance Company which detail their trips to the library in
order to look up a word, presumably for inclusion in
Stevens' poetry. Charles O'Dowd, for one, remembers reading
words in stevens' correspondence that did not seem to fit:
[1] would do exactly what he [Stevens] used to do
all the time: go out into the law library and get
Webster's big dictionary, look [up] the word, and
sure enough, it was right on the spot....
Maybe it was the tenth or twelfth meaning, but it
would be exactly the word that fitted what he was
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trying to get across. . .. He [stevens] would
go after a precise, even though remote meaning.
(40)
17Stevens' most pervasive philosophic influence, widely
agreed by critics, is the Platonic philosopher santayana.
George Lensing describes one way Santayana may have
influenced stevens:
[In Santayana's Interpretations of Poetry and
Religion] Santayana approaches Stevens' own
resolution of the dichotomy [fact-ideal]: the mind
begins with facts but proceeds to 'ideal
constructions.' Another part of his theory,
however, was less consistent with Stevens'. While
Stevens would go 'through' facts to discover the
imaginative ideal, Santayana insisted that the
alliance between the real and the imagined was in
the end an unholy one....Although Stevens would
later share Santayana's notion that the
imagination was 'unreal,' ..•he would hold more
firmly than Santayana to the role of facts as not
only a 'starting point' but also a pervasive and
continuing presence in the exercise of the
imagination. For Santayana, the
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imagination...should acknowledge its discrete
efficacy apart from 'brute fact' and thus resist
the temptation to validate itself in the name of
empirical truth. (27-28)
18Although not as prevalent as other modes of stevens
criticism, there has been recent work on political thought
and influence in his poetry, including the effect of the
world wars. Alan Filreis has published several studies,
including Wallace Stevens and the Actual World, "stevens'
Home Front," and "'This Posture of the Nerves': stevens
Partisan Center." See also works by Jahan Ramazani,
including "Stevens and the War Elegy" and "Elegy and Anti-
Elegy in stevens' Harmonium: Mockery, Melancholia, and the
Pathetic Fallacy."
19See chapter one for an explanation of the use of the
term Romantic as type of critic.
20 Henry v. Wells first claimed "Anecdote of the Jar" to
be about the Fugitive poets, while Charles Walcutt tells of
a student paper which suggested the idea of the Tennessee
Valley Authority dam project.
210ther criticism of "Anecdote of the Jar" includes
Eugene Nasser's figurative study of the jar, Jonathan
Holden's mathematically-based study, Donald Gutierrez's
circular study, and W.J.T. Mitchell's and Kinereth Meyer's
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studies of ekphrasis. Frank Lentricchia has an interesting
account of the jar as an introduction to his book Ariel and
the Police.
Tom Quirk discusses "Anecdote of the Jar" in his
discussion of American Realists. According to Quirk, there
are two concepts of reality working in American literature:
There is the real of realism--i.e., the natural
realism of a common vision--and there is the naive
realism of pure experience before secondary
conceptions have been interposed between that
experience and our appropriation of it as thought.
(47)
Quirk's description aptly describes stevens' conception of
reality and imagination. Quirk says of "Anecdote of the
Jar" that it is an "immanent world of unceasing change, only
glimpsed by the senses but formalized and composed by the
imagination" (50).
220ther anecdotal titles include "Anecdote of Men by
the Thousand," "Anecdote of Canna," "Anecdote of the Prince
of Peacocks," and "Earthy Anecdote," all from Harmonium.
This idea is further reinforced by noting that stevens
considered titling Harmonium, The Whole of Harmonium:
Primary Minutiae.
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23From Walsh's concordance, there are thirty-five
references to "seek," "seeker," "seeking," and "seeks;"
thirty-one references to "search," "searched," "searches,"
"searching," and "sought;" and nine references to "voyage,"
"voyager," and "voyaging." Other synonyms are possible.
241n his introduction to stevens, Robert Pack also
notices the apparent structural play in stevens. He
describes how the "stump" around which Bonnie and Josie
dance in stevens' poem "Life is Motion" is the actual center
of the poem (69).
25This small difference appears to elude some. Donald
Gutierrez cites the title as "Anecdote of a Jar" at one
point, and "Anecdote of the Jar" at another in his article
on stevens and William Carlos Williams (53-54).
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